Reform, these two words play an increasingly important position in today's world football. The weak need to reform, because they must find a tactical strategy that is sufficient to fight against the mid-upper team; the strong also need to reform, because it is difficult to go further on all fronts only by relying on the same tactics. Under such a background environment, people's definition of a famous coach has also undergone subtle changes: those coaches who have helped the team achieve record recovery through tactical reforms are more qualified to be called famous coaches.
In other words, if you want to be recognized as a famous coach in today's world football, it is not enough to have brilliant coaching results. It often requires the ability to lead the team from decline to prosperity. So in today's world football, is there such a coach who helps the team get out of trouble and finally regain its glory? The answer is of course yes. I believe that many fans will involuntarily think of the current Liverpool coach-Jurgen Klopp when they see this question.
For most Liverpool fans, Klopp has brought them too many surprises in the past two seasons. Last season, under the leadership of the German marshal, the Red Army finally achieved 30 wins, 7 draws and 1 loss with 97 points, only 1 point behind Manchester City to win the runner-up. In the Champions League, Liverpool made up for the regret of losing the league: they defeated the Bundesliga giants Bayern Munich, the Portuguese super giants Porto, and the La Liga giants Barcelona in the knockout rounds, and finally joined the final with another Premier League team Tottenham.
In the UEFA Champions League final held on June 2, 2019, Liverpool finally won the 6th Champions League championship in team history by virtue of Salah and Origi's success in the first and second halves.
Time came this season. Although Liverpool led by Klopp were eliminated by Atletico Madrid in the 1/8 finals, they reached a milestone in team history in the league: Liverpool scored 32 wins, 3 draws and 3 in the Premier League this season. With a gorgeous score of 99 points, they led Manchester City to win the Premier League title by up to 18 points (if Liverpool did not perform too badly in the final stage, their lead against Manchester City might be even greater). It is worth mentioning that this is also the first Premier League title in the history of the Red Army Liverpool.
The changes Klopp brought to Liverpool were immediate. A few years ago, the Red Army was just a team with an unstable record, but the German coach used his unique understanding of football to help Liverpool reinvent itself in just a few years. It is now one of the most competitive teams in English football and even in the world.
If we move our vision slightly forward, we can find that the word reform has been almost throughout Klopp's coaching career. In other words, his unique understanding of tactics and determination to reform have been formed in the early stages of coaching. What this German coach has done for many years is just building on the original theoretical basis.
In the following pages, the author will combine Klopp's detailed data from various periods to thoroughly analyze the main tactical system of the German coach's coaching career for all fans.
As a professional player, Klopp has never played in the Bundesliga. In 1990, Klopp became a professional player for the German second team Mainz and played until 2001 (Klopp retired in 2001). In February 2001, Mainz, who had a poor record at the time, chose to hire Klopp, who had just retired, as the new coach. At that time, Mainz was in a difficult period of relegation, and the club's senior management had only one requirement for Klopp: lead the team to stay in the Bundesliga.
作为职业球员，克洛普从未参加过德甲联赛。 1990年，克洛普成为德国第二支球队美因茨的职业球员，并效力至2001年（克洛普于2001年退休）。 2001年2月，当时业绩不佳的美因茨选择聘用刚刚退休的克洛普担任新教练。当时，美因茨正处于降级的艰难时期，俱乐部的高级管理层对克洛普的要求只有一个：带领球队留在德甲。
Unexpectedly, Klopp not only helped the team stay in the Bundesliga, but also gave the team that had never entered the Bundesliga a hope of upgrading. In the 2003-2004 season, Mainz, who was still struggling to relegation a few years ago, under the leadership of Klopp, achieved an excellent result of 34 matches, 13 wins, 15 draws, 6 losses and 54 points. He won the second place in the German second place and successfully won. Eligibility for the Bundesliga next season.
Why should we focus on introducing Klopp’s experience in coaching Mainz? The reason is very simple. As the starting point of his coaching career, most of Klopp's tactical views and personnel use strategies were shaped during this period. At the same time, considering that Mainz was only a relegation team in the sub-level league for a long time, Klopp’s dominant tactics in the early days of coaching were often solid defense, and it was during this period that he created it. A set of unique defensive counterattack concepts. This idea has been continued in Klopp’s career. Whether he is coaching Dortmund or Liverpool, Klopp is often willing to take the initiative to lower his posture when facing some teams whose paper strength is weaker than his own. Adopt a more low-key and pragmatic defensive counterattack strategy.
2006~2007 Bundesliga standings
In the 2006~2007 season, Mainz was relegated to the 11th place in the previous two consecutive seasons. Mainz regrettably relegated (16th in that season). In the 2007~2008 season, Mainz led by Klopp only finished fourth in the Bundesliga, but unfortunately missed the opportunity to upgrade. In this context, Klopp, who has been criticized by many fans, chose to resign and instead accepted Dortmund's invitation in May 2008 to become the new Hornet coach.
It is worth mentioning that Dortmund at that time was far less shining than it is now. After winning the third place in the Bundesliga in the 2002~2003 season, the Hornet's performance in the next 5 seasons can be described as a year inferior: in the 2003~2004 season, they finally won sixth place; the 2004~2005 season and the 2005~2006 season , Dortmund's final results are 7th; in the 2006~2007 season, the results of the Hornets dropped to 9th; time came to the 2007~2008 season, Dortmund ushered in the darkest season in the new century, they are in the league Only with 10 wins, 10 draws, 14 losses and 40 points, ranked 13th.
On the whole, Dortmund was unable to rank among the upper and middle reaches for several consecutive seasons, and even fell into the relegation zone during the 2007~2008 season. After Klopp came to the team, he did not have sufficient manpower deployment. On the contrary, he also needed to construct a set of tactics that can withstand the storm in a short time to help Dortmund regain its glory in the past.
First, Klopp used Dortmund's staffing to determine the main formation. The German coach continues to regard the 4231 formation he admired in Mainz as his first choice. The starting list we listed below is a more conventional set of main lineups when Klopp coached Dortmund. In the center position, Lewandowski appeared more in the starting lineup; in the midfield area, Gundogan (or Shaheen) partnered with Bender to become the team’s two midfielders, behind the forward line The three midfielders are Royce, Gotze, and Blaskovsky. In terms of the back line, Hummels and Subotic are more of the team’s double central defenders, while the left and right full backs They are Pischek and Schmelzer.
After coaching Liverpool, Klopp slightly adjusted the overall tactics he advocated according to the different staffing of the team. First of all, after careful consideration, he changed the team's formation to 433. The tridents at the forward line are Salah, Firmino and Mane; in the midfield area, Fabinho is more of the team. In front of his single midfielder, the two teammates in front of him are captain Henderson and Wijnaldum; in terms of the back line, Van Dijk and Gomez have gradually become the golden partners of the Red Army center back this season. The full-backs are Robertson and Arnold.
From the formation point of view, Klopp was indeed different when he coached Dortmund and Liverpool. But we need to emphasize that the 4231 and 433 formations have something in common to some extent. The team can dynamically adjust the formation during the game by changing the positions of the two wingers. When the team is in a defensive state, the two wingers in the 433 formation can withdraw their positions to the midfield area, and the team changes to a 4231 formation with a larger lateral interception area in the midfield; In the offensive state, the two full-backs can leave the midfield and move to the forward line. The 4231 formation is changed to the 433 formation with more frontcourt.
Klopp has always been a head coach advocating overall football. As early as when he was coaching Dortmund, he had created a set of tactics to integrate goalkeepers into the offensive. But what we need to emphasize is that considering the different personal strengths of goalkeepers, Klopp has also constantly adjusted the way the goalkeeper participates in the attack during the Dortmund period and Liverpool period.
During the coaching of Dortmund, goalkeeper Weidenfeller has excellent goal line response and save skills, but the skills at his feet are hard to say among the top goalkeepers. Under such a background environment, it is obviously unrealistic to give the German goalkeeper the responsibility of handling the ball with too complicated feet. However, Klopp is unwilling to let Weidenfeller clear the ball with a weakly purposeful kick without much adjustment. He hopes that he will send the ball to the two full-backs before the opponent's pressing players are in place. Or at the feet of two full-backs (Klopp was very opposed to the goalkeeper's direct short pass cooperation with the central defender during Dortmund. He believes that such a small-scale cooperation will give the opponent more room to press, and cause the team to lose the ball after losing the ball. Means to make up for it in time).
After coming to Liverpool, Klopp gradually began to transform the defense line with the help of the club's top management. What people praise most is the introduction of Van Dijk, whose performance in the central defender position has become a key factor for Liverpool to compete on multiple fronts. But in addition to Van Dijk, the author believes that the introduction of Brazilian goalkeeper Allison is also very important. Unlike Weidenfeller, Allison has inherited the spirit of samba football that is good at passing underfoot. His handling awareness and passing accuracy at certain times are even as good as some top defenders.
Under such a background environment, Klopp subtly gave Allison more room to deal with the ball. When the Brazilian national goal gets the ball in the backcourt, he will not deliver the ball to the side in a more secure way like Weidenfeller, but will take the initiative to make short runs with one of Van Dijk and Gomez. Transmission connection. For most teams, when the opponent's goalkeeper and defender conduct long-term transmission in the backcourt, they must organize the forwards to press up and press. In this way, Liverpool’s attackers accumulated in the midfield and on the two sides have more space to hold the ball. Once Allison can rush to deliver the ball to the no-man’s land before the opponents are in place, the Red Army will Get a huge counterattack opportunity in a short time.
In terms of the back line, Klopp has a leader in both Dortmund and Liverpool. This man was Hummels in Dortmund and Van Dijk in Liverpool. In terms of technical characteristics, both Hummels and Van Dijk have excellent physical confrontation capabilities, but they are not the traditional central defenders who rely solely on their bodies for head-to-head fights, but have excellent throwing capabilities and overall view of the field. The modern central defender.
Compared to Hummels, Van Dijk has more opportunities to get the ball to organize during the game (Klopp did not want the central defender to take the ball too much when he was coaching Dortmund). But whether it is Hummels or Van Dijk, they have a very clear core idea after getting the ball: to find their own offensive core in the midfield position. It should be emphasized that the offensive core we mentioned here does not necessarily refer to a certain player, but may be a certain offensive group constructed through reasonable tactics.
与Hummels相比，Van Dijk在比赛中有更多机会组织球（克洛普不希望中后卫在执教多特蒙德时过多接球）。但是无论是Hummels还是Van Dijk，他们在拿到球后都有一个非常明确的核心思想：在中场位置找到自己的进攻核心。应该强调的是，我们在这里提到的进攻核心并不一定指某个参与者，而可能是通过合理策略构建的某个进攻集团。
During the Dortmund period, the main way they launched their offense was the three players on the central axis-Gundogan, Gotze and Lewandowski (also Shahin, Shinji Kagawa). Under such a background environment, Hummels will not seek to transfer to the side as soon as he gets the ball, but will use the back midfielder Jingdogan's retracement to penetrate the middle in a local area. When Klopp coached Dortmund, whether Hummels could accurately deliver the ball to Gundogan became a key link for the Hornet's offense. Once Gundogan can control the ball in a relatively open environment, the advantages of more frontcourt staffing in the 4231 formation can be fully utilized. Gundogan can choose to distribute the ball to the side and then play the side center. You can also choose to continue to connect with Gotze or Lewand via a straight plug.
The situation has changed a bit when Klopp coached Liverpool. The Reds are not a team that is very much looking for penetration in the center. At the same time, their Fabinho, Henderson and even Wijnaldum in the midfield are not the kind of organization and scheduling midfielder in the traditional sense. Therefore, Klopp gradually changed the penetration of the center he pursued in Dortmund, turning to the wing attack as his first choice.
In the current Liverpool wing, they almost have the best group of attackers in the world. Therefore, Van Dijk’s first option after getting the ball is not to hand the ball to the midfielder, but to actively divide it to the two wing sides (either through a direct pass to the two full-backs, but also It can be handed over to two wingers with a long pass behind him). Even if the opponent sends multiple people to defend on the wing, considering that Arnold, Mane, Salah and others have very strong personal breakthroughs and team cooperation capabilities, the opposing defensive players want to limit their performance when the number of players is equal. is very difficult.
Of course, there is no tactic that will work forever in the football world. With Liverpool's advocating wing attacking play set off wave after wave in world football, many teams have targeted Klopp's tactics. At some point, they even deliberately relax their marking of Liverpool midfielders, thus enticing the defenders to send the ball into the encirclement formed by their midfielders. Under such a background environment, Klopp also made his own tactical response. He invented an offensive tactic that involves involvement from the opposite side.
As shown in the picture above, when Van Dijk gets the ball in the backcourt, Mane on the left will cooperate with Robertson, who is inserted later, to make a sudden advance attempt to get the ball. In this way, in order to restrict the ball from the two world's top wing players, the overall defense of the opposing team had to move to the left side of Liverpool, and the right side of the Egyptian star Salah gained more passing space from the side. . Under such a background environment, Van Dijk will directly use his excellent long pass to transport the ball to the vacuum area on the right wing, helping Salah gain a certain range of space to take the ball calmly. At the same time, Liverpool's right back Arnold will also make a follow-up move, and the Red Army has obtained a 2-to-1 effective offensive situation within a partial range of the right.
如上图所示，当范·迪克（Van Dijk）在后场拿到球时，左侧的马内（Mane）将与后来插入的罗伯逊（Robertson）合作，以突如其来的进攻尝试拿球。这样，为了限制来自两个世界顶级翼球员的球权，对方球队的整体防守不得不移至利物浦的左侧，而埃及球星萨拉赫的右侧则获得了更多的传球空间。侧。 。在这样的背景环境下，范迪克将直接利用他出色的长传将球转移到右翼的真空区域，从而帮助萨拉赫获得一定范围的空间来平稳地持球。同时，利物浦的右后卫阿诺德也将采取后续行动，红军已经在右边的部分范围内取得了2比1的有效进攻态势。
In addition to defenders launching an offense, Klopp's use of full-backs is also very distinctive. When coaching Liverpool, he promoted the two original full-backs, Robertson and Arnold, to the world's top players. Klopp will also actively use the outstanding foot skills of these two players during the game to allow them to actively participate in the backcourt organization.
Neither Robertson nor Arnold will make an overly accelerated forward penetration during the offensive phase. Instead, they will actively sit in the parallel area of the back line as an effective receiver for Van Dijk. We assume that Robertson received Van Dijk’s pass first, and then Liverpool’s single midfielder Fabinho will actively pull his position to the side to assist the Scottish full-back in organizing. In order to make up for the partial vacuum that Fabinho left the midfielder area, right back Arnold will presuppose his position to the midfielder and become a relatively meaningful midfield organizer.
From the data point of view, Arnold is absolutely capable of becoming an organizer for Liverpool in the midfield area. The England teenager completed 74 key passes in the 2019-2020 season, ranking fifth in the Premier League. At the same time, his number of excellent opportunities created and the number of passes per game can be ranked among all players in the same position (a total of 18 excellent opportunities created, ranking first among all players in the same position; The average number of passes is 64.2, ranking 3rd among all players in the same position).
As far as organizational skills are concerned, Piszczek and Schmelzer are obviously unable to reach the level of Robertson and Arnold. Therefore, when Klopp coached Dortmund, they were positioned to provide the team with the width of the formation during the transition from defense to offense, so that the ball-holding guard could find a stable wing receiving point in the first time.
As shown in the figure above, Arnold and Robertson averaged 59.1 and 65.3 passes per game in the past three seasons. In contrast, Pišček and Schmelzer, these two players averaged only 39.9 and 37.6 passes per game in the 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2014-2015 seasons. It can be found that Arnold and Robertson's average number of passes per game is much higher than that of Pishcek and Schmelzer. Even when compared with some midfielders, Arnold and Robertson are not much better.
Klopp's different ideas for organizing offense can also be clearly reflected from the comparison of the average possession rate of Dortmund and Liverpool. As shown in the above figure, Dortmund's average possession rate in the 2012~2013 season, 2013~2014 season, and 2014~2015 season were 54.1%, 52.8% and 53.2% respectively. By the time Klopp coached Liverpool, due to the strong ability of the midfielders and the ability to control the short pass in a local area, the average possession rate of the Red Army has been significantly improved. Their average possession rate in the 2017~2018 season reached 57.9%, in the 2018~2019 season, their average possession rate reached 58.5%, and this season's average possession rate increased to 58.8%.
Generally speaking, Liverpool's trio in the midfield area are Henderson, Wijnaldum and Fabinho. Friends who understand the technical characteristics of these three players should know that the three of them are not those organizing midfielders with outstanding offensive capabilities. Liverpool’s more offensive tactics still need to rely on the front trident and two full-backs to complete. Under such a background environment, Henderson and Wijnaldum tend to put more of their responsibilities on defense during the game. They will be asked by Klopp to make up for their responsibilities after the two full-backs are highly pressed. Space behind him.
People always praise Arnold and Robertson for their excellent assists. They have grown into the two top full-backs in world football in the past two seasons. But while we praised them, don’t forget Henderson and Wijnaldum, who escorted them behind them. Without these two players’ defenses during the game, Robertson and Arnold were exposed after being highly pressed. The space behind will become a counterattack point for many teams.
The position of Liverpool's single midfielder midfielder determines that they have a relatively large lateral interception area in the defensive process. It is unrealistic for opponents to use a small range to pass through the midfield quickly. But this advantage could not be reflected in the Dortmund era. At that time, the 4231 formation that Klopp respected needed more reliance on the performance of the two back midfielders in the defensive process, but it was difficult for Gundogan and Bender to defend. The area covers the entire backcourt.
In terms of technical characteristics, Bender has relatively good running ability. He can often be "timely" and "effective" in remedial defenses on the wing, but the running ability of another midfielder, Jing Duoan, is relatively important. A lot weaker. In other words, we cannot treat Gundogan as a single defensive midfielder. The German star's more ability is reflected in his excellent passing footwork and excellent overall view of the field. Under such a background environment, in order to ensure that Gundogan can play the responsibility of mobilizing the overall situation during the game, Klopp will not order Gundogan to move left and right, but will shift his The position is fixed in the midfield.
Dortmund's double midfielder match is a bit like the golden partner of Milan midfielder-Gattuso + Pirlo. Many fans may have some doubts when seeing this: even in the star-studded AC Milan, Pirlo is also protected by Gattuso and Ambrosini. How can Dortmund rely on Bender alone to achieve a stable defense? ? The answer is very simple. Relying on Bender alone cannot guarantee the stability of the backcourt defense. As a head coach who attaches great importance to the quality of defense, Klopp also gave his own response plan: he reduced the full backs. The intensity of the insertion is required to avoid the two full-backs pressing forward at the same time as much as possible. In other words, when a full-back inserts an assist, another full-back must stay in the midfielder's midfielder area to help Bender form an interception line.
The differences in player characteristics directly lead to the different ways the two teams launch offenses in the frontcourt. When coaching Dortmund, Klopp would still firmly choose to attack along the center after the ball passed halftime. When Gundogan channeled the ball to the opponent's defensive hinterland, Dortmund's central midfielder Gotze's flexible character became more useful. The German star will not fix the ball at a certain point after Gundogan takes the ball, but will repeatedly move laterally before the opponent's defense line, disturbing the opponent's overall defense position.
Gotze's repeated lateral movements not only disrupted the overall position of the opponent's defense line, but also allowed the defenders to focus more on him, thus ignoring the restrictions on Gundogan's marking. When Gundogan and Goce appeared together in the top area of the arc, the opponent's back line could only make a very passive upward pressure in an attempt to block and restrict Gundogan and Goce's further ball-holding operations. In this way, Gundogan and Goetze's space for the ball is indeed reduced, but Dortmund's main striker Lewand can get more running space from the side. At the same time, when Gundogan and Gotze control the ball from the periphery, Dortmund's two wingers can also actively receive the center, helping Lewandowski to form a more layered outflank system.
Unlike Dortmund, Liverpool is a team that is very focused on wing attack. Let's take the Red Army's right attack as an example. When Arnold makes an assist to the frontcourt, he will form an effective attack with more enemies and fewer enemies with Salah on the right. At the same time, as we said earlier, Wijnaldum, one of the Red Army midfielders, will move to the right in time during the game to protect the gap between Arnold and Salah. When Salah and Arnold had no worries during the offensive, their dribbling skills and awareness of small-scale cooperation would have more room for display.
As we all know, Liverpool's midfield is the weakest link in their three fronts, while the wingers and full-backs are their most starring links. With such a personnel base as a background, people will always take it for granted that all Liverpool's offenses are launched from the side. In fact, this kind of thinking is completely wrong. Although Liverpool's midfielder's ability to play has not reached the top level, Klopp has also created a unique offensive plan: use the center to retreat to increase the midfield's organizational ability.
Firmino can be regarded as a "heterogeneous" in today's world football. As a well-known center forward, he is not known for the number of goals. The Brazilian current country has only 9 goals in the Premier League during the season, which is not even as good as some relegation forwards. But the reason why Firmino is still able to rank among the world's top centers is because of his selfless dedication and organizational ability comparable to top midfielders. Firmino created 10 excellent scoring opportunities in the 2019~2020 Premier League season, ranking 4th among all players in the same position. At the same time, his assists, key passes per game and the number of passes per game are all ranked first among all players in the same position.
How does Firmino play an organizing role in the offensive process? A very obvious manifestation is a sharp retracement. The above picture is a heat map of Firmino in the 2019~2020 season. It can be clearly seen that the Brazilian star has been active in midfield even longer than in the penalty area. To some extent, Firmino's characteristics of being good at retreating try to make up for the shortcomings of the Red Army's lack of offensive ability in the midfield, and can also stimulate the scoring ability of the two wingers Mane and Salah.
As shown in the picture above, when Firmino retreats to the midfield to get the ball, it will inevitably attract the opposing team's 1 or 2 central defenders to press up. In this way, when he passes the ball to the foot of a winger or full back who is inserted from the side, the opponent's defense near the penalty point will have a momentary vacuum. Under such a background environment, Klopp would not require Firmino to quickly insert into the penalty area to outflank the penalty area (this will cause the player to consume too much energy and the offensive tactics cannot be sustained), but will order the difference The winger on the side received an outflank in the middle of the penalty area. Klopp’s set of tactics not only makes good use of Firmino’s ability to organize and mobilize, but also makes up for the shortcomings of insufficient midfielder ability. It also allows Salah and Mane to have more excellent shooting skills. It can be described as killing three birds with one stone.
Because of this tactic, Liverpool's two wingers tend to score the most goals in their array, rather than being the Indian center, Firmino. Liverpool's reliance on wing passes is well known in today's world football. They averaged 20, 19.2 and 24.1 passes in the past three seasons. This data is much higher than Dortmund (the average number of crosses per game for the Hornet in the 2012-2013 season was 17.8, the average number of passes per game in the 2013-2014 season was 15.9, and the average number of passes per game in the 2014-2015 season. The median is 15.8 times).
Speaking of Klopp's tactical reforms on the defensive end, I believe that many fans will unanimously think of a big tactic that the German coach highly respected-high pressure. In short, the so-called high-pressure pressing strategy is to quickly organize the frontcourt interception line after losing the ball, and form a multi-faceted encirclement for the opponent's ball holder in a short time, in order to achieve the purpose of quickly stealing the ball and launching a counterattack. High-pressure pressing tactics have now become the first choice of many giants. Although this tactic will be criticized as too risky, it can realize the core idea of "offensive instead of defensive" as the head coach most of the time.
Let's first introduce Liverpool's high-pressure pressing strategy. Klopp, who attaches great importance to the wing, will also give two wingers very important responsibilities in the high-pressure pressing tactic. Generally speaking, today's Red Army puts more emphasis on "blocking route tactics" with full resilience. As shown in the picture above, when the opposing defender controls the ball, the center forward Firmino will first move forward quickly to block the opponent's mid pass. Under such a background environment, the opposing guard with the ball can only choose to transport the ball to the wing. At this moment, Klopp's unique tactics for the two wingers can play a key role: after losing the ball, Klopp will not ask Salah and Mane to rush towards the opposing hand in the first time with Firmino. The ball player, instead, will order the two of them to spread to the two sides, cutting off the opponent's pass from the center back to the full back.
"Encircle without grabbing" is a very critical link in Liverpool's high-pressure pressing tactics. It not only effectively prevents the frontcourt players from consuming their physical energy due to excessive unnecessary running, but also makes the opponent's shots full of restrictions and unable to achieve point-to-point accurate transmission. In this context, the opposing guard with the ball ushered in only two endings: one, because of the lack of a pass line, was intercepted by Firmino; two, in order to avoid the pass being broken, he chose to open aimlessly. After a clearance, the ball returned to Liverpool's control.
Klopp's pressing strategy in Dortmund was slightly different. The tactics they used were led by Lewandowski at the core. As shown in the picture above, Royce and Blaskovsky will not cut off the passing route of the central defender to the wing for the first time, but will wait for center Lewandowski to give each other two possessions. The central defenders exerted enough pressure to force them to transfer the ball to the feet of unguarded full-backs. Some friends may be very confused when they see this: Why doesn't Klopp emphasize placing the pressing area in the middle, but allows the opposing center back to transfer the ball to the side with a very relaxed attitude? The reason is very simple. After all, the middle road is a relatively broad area, and it is more difficult to organize the encirclement in a short time. The sideline is completely different. The sideline is a natural barrier for Dortmund. The Hornet can use a smaller number of people to achieve a more comprehensive approach.
When the opposing full-back gets the ball, Dortmund will adopt a seemingly aggressive pressing strategy, which is to abandon the defensive layout in certain areas and instead concentrate most of the defenders in the opposing ball holding area for high-intensity pressing . The advantages and disadvantages of this pressing tactic are very obvious, the advantage is that it can greatly increase the success rate of pressing. But from another perspective, the shortcomings of this press tactic are also unbearable for Dortmund: if the interception encirclement formed by doing all you can still does not restrict the opponent's pass, the opponent will successfully transport the ball to your own defense. Weak areas, then the Hornet’s defense and even the goalkeeper are completely exposed in front of the opposing players, and the probability of losing the ball will be greatly increased.
Although Klopp's achievements in Dortmund are not as good as now, we cannot deny Klopp's achievements in German football. On the contrary, a series of key tactics and core ideas used by the German coach in his coaching career were formed during the Dortmund period. Now what he has done in Liverpool is to perfect this system as much as possible.
Compared with Guardiola's ultimate offense and Mourinho's ultimate defense, Klopp's tactics are more balanced. When it is necessary to open the situation, Klopp’s team can also show gorgeous short pass penetration and side-to-side combination; when it needs to stabilize the situation, Klopp’s team can also use two tactics of high-pressure pressing and shrinking defense. Switch between calmly. In short, Klopp represents another major tactical trend in today's world football-openness, tolerance and tolerance. He will not rule out any effective tactics for his side, but only seek to achieve the desired result in a form that is more suitable for the game process.